Default Swap Games Driven by Spectrally Negative Levy Processes
Preprint
Abstract
This paper studies game-type credit default swaps that allow the protection buyer and seller to raise or reduce their respective positions once prior to default. This leads to the study of an optimal stopping game subject to early default termination. Under a structural credit risk model based on spectrally negative Levy processes, we apply the principles of smooth and continuous fit to identify the equilibrium exercise strategies for the buyer and the seller. We then rigorously prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium and compute the contract value at equilibrium. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the impacts of default risk and other contractual features on the players' exercise timing at equilibrium.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Precautionary measures for credit risk management in jump modelsStochastics, 2011
- A note on scale functions and the time value of ruin for Lévy insurance risk processesInsurance: Mathematics and Economics, 2010
- Optimal Stopping Games and Nash EquilibriumTheory of Probability & Its Applications, 2009
- Arbitrage pricing of defaultable game options with applications to convertible bondsQuantitative Finance, 2008
- Optimal Stopping Games for Markov ProcessesSIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2008
- Principles of smooth and continuous fit in the determination of endogenous bankruptcy levelsFinance and Stochastics, 2006
- A Two‐Person Game for Pricing Convertible BondsSIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2006
- Some calculations for Israeli optionsFinance and Stochastics, 2004
- The term structure of credit spreads with jump riskJournal of Banking & Finance, 2001
- Randomization and the American PutThe Review of Financial Studies, 1998