ALTERNATIVE COLLECTIVE‐GOODS MODELS OF MILITARY ALLIANCES: THEORY AND EMPIRICS
Authors:
- John A.C. ConybeareJCJohn A.C. Conybeare
- James C. MurdochJMJames C. Murdoch
- Todd SandlerTSTodd Sandler
- 1 October 1994
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 32 (4) , 525-542
Abstract
How should the defense activities of allies be aggregated to determine the alliance‐wide level of defense? Two alternative models–best shot and weakest link–are contrasted with simple summation of defense spending or manpower for aggregating allies' defense efforts. We extend the joint product model to include these methods of aggregation, and devise an empirical procedure to test between best‐shot and weakest ‐link models. We apply this test to four alliances: Triple Alliance (1880–1914), Triple Entente (1880–1914), Warsaw Pact (1963–1987), and NATO (1961–1987). The testing procedure can be applied to other collective choice situations.Keywords
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 1880–1914: A Collective Goods ApproachAmerican Political Science Review, 1990
- Defence expenditures by countries in allied and adversarial relationshipsDefence Economics, 1990
- On distinguishing the behavior of nuclear and non‐nuclear allies in NATODefence Economics, 1990
- An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public GoodsJournal of Political Economy, 1989
- The Slowdown in Soviet Defense ExpendituresSouthern Economic Journal, 1988
- Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public goodJournal of Public Economics, 1984
- Gross national product in Europe 1870–1910: Some new estimatesExplorations in Economic History, 1983
- The demand for military expenditures: An international comparisonPublic Choice, 1981
- A Maximum Likelihood Procedure for Regression with Autocorrelated ErrorsEconometrica, 1978
- Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western AlliesReview of Economics and Statistics, 1967