Rational models of conditioning
Author:
- 23 April 2009
- journal article
- open peer-commentary
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 32 (2) , 204-205
Abstract
Mitchell et al. argue that conditioning phenomena may be better explained by high-level, rational processes, rather than by non-cognitive associative mechanisms. This commentary argues that this viewpoint is compatible with neuroscientific data, may extend to nonhuman animals, and casts computational models of reinforcement learning in a new light.Keywords
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