The rationality wars: a personal reflection
Open Access
- 22 November 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioural Public Policy
- Vol. 9 (3) , 495-515
Abstract
During the Cold War, logical rationality – consistency axioms, subjective expected utility maximization, Bayesian probability updating – became the bedrock of economics and other social sciences. In the 1970s, logical rationality underwent attack by the heuristics-and-biases program, which interpreted the theory as a universal norm of how individuals should make decisions, although such an interpretation is absent in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s foundational work and dismissed by Savage. Deviations in people’s judgments from the theory were thought to reveal stable cognitive biases, which were in turn thought to underlie social problems, justifying governmental paternalism. In the 1990s, the ecological rationality program entered the field, based on the work of Simon. It moves beyond the narrow bounds of logical rationality and analyzes how individuals and institutions make decisions under uncertainty and intractability. This broader view has shown that many supposed cognitive biases are marks of intelligence rather than irrationality, and that heuristics are indispensable guides in a world of uncertainty. The passionate debate between the three research programs became known as the rationality wars. I provide a brief account from the ‘frontline’ and show how the parties understood in strikingly different ways what the war entailed.Keywords
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