Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another
Authors:
- Sandro ShelegiaSSSandro Shelegia
- Yossi SpiegelYSYossi Spiegel
- 1 January 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 114 (1) , 136-138
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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