THE HEART OF LIBERTARIANISM: FUNDAMENTALITY AND THE WILL
Author:
- 3 September 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Social Philosophy and Policy
- Vol. 36 (01) , 72-92
Abstract
It is often claimed that libertarianism offers an unattractive conception of free will and moral responsibility because it renders free agency inexplicable and irrational. This essay aims, first, to show that the soundness of these objections turns on more basic disagreements concerning the ideals of free agency and, second, to develop and motivate a truly libertarian conception of the ideals of free agency. The central contention of the essay is that the heart of libertarians’ ideal of free agency is the ideal of agential fundamentality.Keywords
This publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
- Freedom within Reason2005
- Caring, Identification, and AgencyEthics, 2003
- Freedom and ResponsibilityPhilosophical Review, 2000
- Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: Does self-control resemble a muscle?Psychological Bulletin, 2000
- Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended AgencyPhilosophical Review, 2000
- Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of DeterminismThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1999
- A Compatibilist Version Of The Theory Of Agent CausationPacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1999
- What Happens When Someone Acts?Mind, 1992
- Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a PersonThe Journal of Philosophy, 1971
- I.—FREE WILL AS INVOLVING DETERMINATION AND INCONCEIVABLE WITHOUT ITMind, 1934