Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict
Authors:
- Dan ReiterDRDan Reiter
- Erik R. TillmanETErik R. Tillman
- 1 August 2002
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 64 (3) , 810-826
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate DyadsJournal of Conflict Resolution, 2000
- Unpacking democracy: Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and theories of democratic peaceSecurity Studies, 2000
- Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903–1994: A Quantitative Empirical TestInternational Studies Quarterly, 1999
- Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition, And Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence from Parliamentary Systems, 1946-89Journal of Peace Research, 1999
- Double TakeJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1997
- Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical PatternsConflict Management and Peace Science, 1996
- Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–88American Political Science Review, 1996
- Democracies and War Participation:European Journal of International Relations, 1995
- Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never HappenInternational Security, 1995
- Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and WarJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1991