Cost Allocation for Inertia and Frequency Response Ancillary Services
- 17 January 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation
- Vol. 2 (3) , 328-338
Abstract
The reduction in system inertia is creating an important market for frequency-containment Ancillary Services (AS) such as enhanced frequency response (e.g., provided by battery storage), traditional primary frequency response and inertia itself. This market presents an important difference with the energy-only market: while the need for energy production is driven by the demand from consumers, frequency-containment AS are procured because of the need to deal with the largest generation/demand loss in the system (or smaller losses that could potentially compromise frequency stability). Thus, a question that arises is: who should pay for frequency-containment AS? In this work, we propose a cost-allocation methodology based on the nucleolus concept, in order to distribute the total payments for frequency-containment AS among all generators or loads that create the need for these services. It is shown that this method complies with necessary properties for the AS market, such as avoidance of cross-subsidies and maintaining players in this cooperative game. Finally, we demonstrate its practical applicability through a case study for the Great Britain power system, while comparing its performance with two alternative mechanisms, namely proportional and Shapley value cost allocation.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
- Cost allocation and airport problemsMathematical Social Sciences, 2024
- Efficient methods for approximating the Shapley value for asset sharing in energy communitiesApplied Energy, 2022
- Ancillary services in Great Britain during the COVID-19 lockdown: A glimpse of the carbon-free futureApplied Energy, 2021
- Finding and verifying the nucleolus of cooperative gamesMathematical Programming, 2020
- Pricing inertia and Frequency Response with diverse dynamics in a Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Programming formulationApplied Energy, 2020
- A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problemsAnnals of Operations Research, 2015
- A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problemsSocial Choice and Welfare, 2011
- Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexitiesEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 2005
- A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special caseInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1974
- Cores of convex gamesInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1971