Ownership and political control: Evidence from charter amendments
Authors:
- John Zhuang LiuJLJohn Zhuang Liu
- Angela Huyue ZhangAZAngela Huyue Zhang
- 1 December 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 60
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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