Low-Cost Side Channel Remote Traffic Analysis Attack in Packet Networks
Authors:
- S. KadloorSKS. Kadloor
- X. GongXGX. Gong
- N. KiyavashNKN. Kiyavash
- T. TezcanTTT. Tezcan
- N. BorisovNBN. Borisov
- 1 May 2010
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 2137 (15503607) , 1-5
Abstract
This paper presents a dangerous low-cost traffic analysis attack in packet-based networks, such as the Internet. The attack is mountable in any scenario where a shared routing resource exists among users. A real-world attack successfully compromised the privacy of a user without requiring significant resources in terms of access, memory, or computational power. The effectiveness of our attack is demonstrated in a scenario where the user's DSL router uses FCFS scheduling policy. Specifically, we show that by using a low-rate sequence of probes, a remote attacker can obtain significant traffic-timing and volume information about a particular user, just by observing the round trip time of the probes. We also observe that even when the scheduling policy is changed to round-robin, while the correlation reduces significantly, the attacker can still reliably deduce user's traffic pattern. Most of the router scheduling policies designed to date are evaluated mostly on the metrics of throughput, delay and fairness. Our work is aimed to demonstrate a need for considering an additional metric that quantifies the information leak between the individual traffic flows through the router.Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Identifying Proxy Nodes in a Tor Anonymization Circuit2008
- Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP 2008), 2008
- Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections2006
- Privacy Vulnerabilities in Encrypted HTTP Streams2006
- Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor2005
- A measurement study of available bandwidth estimation tools2003