Do Asymmetries of Temporal Ontology Ground There Being Reasons to Have (Certain) Temporal Attitudes?
Author:
Open Access
- 22 April 2026
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Philosophies
- Vol. 11 (3) , 66
Abstract
It has been argued that one or other asymmetry in temporal ontology grounds there being reasons to have certain temporal attitudes which we not only have, but also judge to be reasonable, and that this gives us reason to posit that asymmetry. Call this general form of argument, the Argument from Reasonable Attitudes (ARA). There are several versions of this argument depending on (a) the posited asymmetry and (b) the attitude(s) mentioned and (c) whether the reasons adduced are subjective or objective. I argue that none of the resulting versions of the ARA are sound, and so reflecting on the nature of these temporal attitudes does not furnish us a reason to posit an asymmetry in temporal ontology.Keywords
Funding Information
- Australian Research Council (DP240100208)
- Australian Research Council (DP250100887)
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