The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
Author:
- H. Peyton YoungHYH. Peyton Young
- 1 May 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 171 (7) , 429-433
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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