Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study

Authors:
  • ABAndré Blais
    André Blais
  • JLJean-François Laslier
    Jean-François Laslier
  • NSNicolas Sauger
    Nicolas Sauger
  • KSKarine van der Straeten
    Karine van der Straeten

  • 1 January 2008
Abstract
We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked preferences we find that One-round voting and Two-round voting generate significant path dependent effects, whereas Approval voting elects the Condorcet winner and Single Transferable vote (Hare system) does not. From the analysis of individual data we conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too involved, in which case they rely on simple heuristics.