Pivots versus signals in elections
Authors:
- Adam MeirowitzAMAdam Meirowitz
- Kenneth W. ShottsKSKenneth W. Shotts
- 1 March 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 144 (2) , 744-771
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 22 references indexed in Scilit:
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