Educational spread as a 'Coordination Game' – theory and application to Portugal
- 1 January 2025
- journal article
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Journal of Dynamics and Games
- Vol. 12 (4) , 484-495
Abstract
This paper examines the recent evolution of higher education in Portugal under the light of an $ n $-person coordination game. We feature two alternative coordination requirements, namely "unanimity", which expresses a cooperative agreement, and "$ k $-coordination", which is driven by efficiency considerations. We find that public policy has driven higher education to fully cover the territory, and in particular individuals living in sparsely populated areas. This orientation might have brought about a loss of scale economies in teaching and, consequently, in the efficiency of tertiary education. This is a plausible explanation for the disconnect between higher education spread and economic growth during the more recent period.
Keywords
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