Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action
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Preprint
- 1 May 2004
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.Keywords
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