A Game-Theoretic Approach for Network Security Using Honeypots
Open Access
- 30 November 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Future Internet
- Vol. 14 (12) , 362
Abstract
Cybersecurity plays an increasing role in today’s digital space, and its methods must keep pace with the changes. Both public and private sector researchers have put efforts into strengthening the security of networks by proposing new approaches. This paper presents a method to solve a game theory model by defining the contents of the game payoff matrix and incorporating honeypots in the defense strategy. Using a probabilistic approach we propose the course-of-action Stackelberg game (CoASG), where every path of the graph leads to an undesirable state based on security issues found in every host. The reality of the system is represented by a cost function which helps us to define a payoff matrix and find the best possible combination of the strategies once the game is run. The results show the benefits of using this model in the early prevention stages for detecting cyberattack patterns.Keywords
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