On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
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Abstract
A noncooperative game is formulated on a transportation network with congestion. The players are associated with origin‐destination pairs, and are facing demand functions at their respective destination nodes. A Nash‐Cournot equilibrium is defined and conditions for existence and uniqueness of this solution are provided. The asymptotic behavior of the Nash‐Cournot equilibrium is then shown to yield (under appropriate assumptions) a total flow vector corresponding to a Wardrop equilibrium.Keywords
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