Information, Nonexcludability, and Financial Market Structure
Authors:
- Bharat N. AnandBABharat N. Anand
- Alexander GaletovicAGAlexander Galetovic
- 1 July 2000
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Business
- Vol. 73 (3) , 357-402
Abstract
We study the determinants of market structure in financial intermediation markets when property rights over information are weak. We show that incentives to gat...Keywords
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