Shuffle-Sum: Coercion-Resistant Verifiable Tallying for STV Voting
Authors:
- 9 October 2009
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 4 (4) , 685-698
Abstract
There are many advantages to voting schemes in which voters rank all candidates in order, rather than just choosing their favorite. However, these schemes inherently suffer from a coercion problem when there are many candidates, because a coercer can demand a certain permutation from a voter and then check whether that permutation appears during tallying. Recently developed cryptographic voting protocols allow anyone to audit an election (universal verifiability), but existing systems are either not applicable to ranked voting at all, or reveal enough information about the ballots to make voter coercion possible. We solve this problem for the popular single transferable vote (STV) ranked voting system, by constructing an algorithm for the verifiable tallying of encrypted votes. Our construction improves upon existing work because it extends to multiple-seat STV and reveals less information than other schemes. The protocol is based on verifiable shuffling of homomorphic encryptions, a well-studied primitive in the voting arena. Our protocol is efficient enough to be practical, even for a large election.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Linked-List Approach to Cryptographically Secure Elections Using Instant Runoff Voting2008
- Multi-party Indirect Indexing and Applications2007
- Implementing STV securely in Pret a Voter20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'07), 2007
- A Private Stable Matching AlgorithmLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006
- Receipt-Free Universally-Verifiable Voting with Everlasting Privacy2006
- Improved Efficiency for Private Stable MatchingLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2006
- Event Driven Private CountersLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2005
- A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting2001
- Efficient Proofs that a Committed Number Lies in an Interval2000
- Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract)1994