Abstract
An evolutionary game model of air-to-sea identification and detection confrontation is proposed in order to solve the problem of how to choose the attack and defense strategies in the identification and detection stages. First, the mathematical model of an air-to-sea attack strategy in identification and detection stages is established, and then the mathematical model of ship defense strategy in identification and detection stages is established. On this basis, the air-to-sea identification and detection revenue function is constructed, and then the corresponding evolutionary game model of air-to-sea identification and detection is established. An algorithm is proposed to solve the air-to-sea identification and detection confrontation evolutionary game model by replicating the dynamic equation. The resultant simulation shows that: For the jamming party and the anti-jamming party, faced the prerequisite of not knowing what jamming mode the other party will take, the anti-jamming party’s choice of frequency agility and the jamming party’s adoption of frequency-sweeping jamming can be the optimal strategies irrespective of the enemy’s choice. The simulation results verify the validity of the game model, which can provide better decision support for the commander’s rational decisions.