General Deterrence and International Conflict: Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory
Open Access
- 26 February 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 36 (1) , 60-85
Abstract
Since general deterrence necessarily precedes immediate deterrence, the analysis of general deterrence is more fundamental to an understanding of international conflict than is an analysis of immediate deterrence. Nonetheless, despite a few exceptions, the quantitative literature has ignored the subject of general deterrence, focusing almost exclusively on situations of immediate deterrence. My purpose in this essay is to fill this evidentiary gap by subjecting a recently developed theory of general deterrence—Perfect Deterrence Theory—to a systematic test by examining general deterrence from 1816–2000. The results indicate that the predictions of perfect deterrence theory are strongly supported by the empirical record.Keywords
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