Resource Allocation and Organizational Form
Authors:
- 1 May 2010
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-33
Abstract
We develop a theory of firm scope and structure in which merging two firms allows the integrated firm's top management to allocate resources that are costly to trade. However, information about their use resides with division managers. We show that establishing truthful upward communication raises the cost of inducing managerial effort compared with stand-alone firms. This effect dominates a positive effect on effort driven by competition for the firm's resources. We derive predictions about optimal firm scope and structure. In particular, we show why it is optimal to separate the tasks of allocating resources and running a division. (JEL D21, D23, D82, G34)Keywords
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