Do private equity funds compensate investors for illiquidity through superior returns? We develop and distribute to the public a fully reproducible model of fund returns that allows exact identification of the effects of different treatments on a large number of performance metrics. We simulate 50 million synthetic funds and estimate the full distribution of fund returns under explicitly calibrated cash flow structures, circumventing the sample selection bias, NAV manipulation, and vintage dependence that limit existing empirical estimates. Under the standard 2/20 compensation structure, fewer than 46% of simulated funds outperform a passive public markets equivalent on a raw return basis, with mean underperformance of approximately 1%. However, PE funds exhibit substantially lower return volatility, yielding a risk-adjusted performance twice as large as that of a public markets benchmark. Analyzing the contractual determinants of returns, we find that modifying hurdle rates and carried interests produce modest LP gains but have large, asymmetric effects on GP incentives. Differently, the catch-up provision emerges as the dominant source of distributional distortion. We develop a theoretical model that identifies an interior optimal catch-up parameter of approximately 60\% of the current market practice, robust to LP risk preferences but sensitive to GP effort productivity.