Persuasion via Weak Institutions
Authors:
- Elliot LipnowskiELElliot Lipnowski
- Doron RavidDRDoron Ravid
- Denis ShishkinDSDenis Shishkin
- 1 October 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 130 (10) , 2705-2730
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
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