Evolutionary Strategies of Supply Chain Finance From the Perspective of a Return Policy

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Abstract
Return policy and supply chain finance are significant measures for banks and enterprises to improve the overall competitiveness of their supply chain. Supervision and guidance by banks are prerequisites to the smooth implementation of return policy and supply chain finance. This study analyzes the evolutionary stable strategy of three parties, namely, one bank, one supplier and one retailer, by establishing an asymmetric evolutionary game model. The model assumes that banks apply a reward and punishment policy for suppliers and retailers. Results show that regardless of the strategy the bank chooses, one party will always choose non-implementation of the return policy or non-adoption of the supply chain finance. From a short-term perspective, regardless of the strategy the bank chooses, suppliers and retailers will select the strategy of non-implementation and non-adoption, respectively. From the long-term perspective, suppliers and retailers will actively choose implementation and adoption whether or not there is bank supervision.
Funding Information
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (71303143)
  • Ministry of Education of the Humanities and Social Science Project (18YJA630137)

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