Democratization and Institutional Change in Mexico
Author:
- 1 February 2001
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 34 (1) , 3-29
Abstract
This article builds on previous work examining the incentives facing authoritarian elites to use central bank reform to constrain the economic policy choices of future governments. It suggests that because creating an autonomous agency is costly, authoritarian elites will only cede policymaking powers to an independent body commensurate with the degree of democratic threat that they face. When a transition is looming, insulation should be complete so as to tie the hands of successor governments to the greatest extent possible. But when this risk of replacement is milder, incumbent elites will be careful to design rules that continue to afford them some margin of maneuver as long as they remain in office. The Mexican central bank reform of 1993 is used as an illustration of the partial insulation strategy at work.Keywords
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