CEO Gender, Corporate Risk-Taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation
Authors:
Preprint
- 1 January 2012
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We extend the literature on how managerial traits relate to corporate choices by documenting that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than otherwise similar firms run by male CEOs. Additionally, transitions from male to female CEOs (or vice-versa) are associated with economically and statistically significant reductions (increases) in corporate risk-taking. The results are robust to controlling for the endogenous matching between firms and CEOs using a variety of econometric techniques. We further document that this risk-avoidance behavior appears to lead to distortions in the capital allocation process. These results potentially have important macroeconomic implications for long-term economic growth.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Does Gender Matter?Management Science, 2012
- The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012
- A GENERAL VIEW OF LOMBARD STREET2011
- Risk Aversion and Wealth: Evidence from Person-to-Person Lending Portfolios2010
- Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance☆Journal of Financial Economics, 2009
- On the Real Effects of Private Equity Investment: Evidence from New Business CreationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock InvestmentThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001
- Economics and Identity*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
- Finance and the sources of growthJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal EffectsBiometrika, 1983