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Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
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Publications
Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry
Author:
JS
Jan Svejnar
Jan Svejnar
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1 September 1986
journal article
Published by
JSTOR
in
Econometrica
Vol. 54
(5)
,
1055
DOI:
10.2307/1912322
Abstract
No abstract available
Keywords
BARGAINING POWER
WAGE SETTLEMENTS
DISAGREEMENT
FEAR
THEORY
U.S
All Related Versions
Version 1, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
Cited
Cited by 180 articles
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