Counteroffers and Efficiency in Labor Markets with Asymmetric Information
Author:
- Limor GolanLGLimor Golan
- 1 April 2005
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 23 (2) , 373-393
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Structure of Wages and Investment in General TrainingJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Why Do Firms Train? Theory and EvidenceThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
- Promotion, Turnover, and Discretionary Human Capital AcquisitionJournal of Labor Economics, 1998
- Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture RevisitedJournal of Labor Economics, 1996
- Layoffs and LemonsJournal of Labor Economics, 1991
- Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling PerspectiveJournal of Labor Economics, 1990
- Managerial Task Assignment and PromotionsEconometrica, 1988
- Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility HypothesisThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987
- Adverse Selection in the Labour MarketReview of Economic Studies, 1986
- Job Assignments, Signalling, and EfficiencyThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1984