Abstract
Transboundary water law and diplomacy still largely describe rivers in the binary language of shared versus national water, or in fixed volumetric allocation shares. The painted water (PW) approach classifies a basin's water instead by whether it is controlled and consumed (red), controllable given existing infrastructure but not necessarily used (yellow), or genuinely uncontrollable given present resources, infrastructure, or geography (green), categories understood as overlapping and riparian-relative rather than fixed. This paper extends PW from a static classification into a longitudinal accounting framework and applies it to the Harirud/Tejen basin, shared by Afghanistan (upstream) and Iran and Turkmenistan (downstream), using 43 years (1980–2022) of discharge, agricultural, and demographic data alongside a dated record of dam construction. We show that the basin's color composition has shifted fundamentally over the period: Afghan consumptive (red) demand has risen almost without interruption, uncontrolled (green) water has collapsed to zero in several recent years, and a wholly new (yellow) category of controllable water appeared abruptly in 2016 with the completion of the Salma Dam, then collapsed back to zero in the driest years despite the infrastructure remaining fully in place, underscoring that infrastructure creates potential negotiability that hydrology may or may not allow to be realized. Decomposing the 984 MCM historical downstream benchmark associated with the Iran–Turkmenistan reach by color shows that this figure was reliant on an implicit draw on Afghan consumption for more than half the record, that yellow water has offered a genuine window for negotiated, non-zero-sum bargaining in only five of the forty-three years, and that in the most recent drought years part of the benchmark is unmeetable under any outcome. Read against the region's hydro-political history, including the Iran–Turkmenistan Doosti Dam agreement, built during a period of Afghan state absence and green-water abundance, the case suggests that cooperation demonstrated under abundance should not be assumed to transfer to conditions of scarcity. We conclude by showing how institutional design must respond to this changing negotiability, illustrating the argument with a sequenced set of governance principles rather than a single prescribed treaty.