Quantity discounts in single-period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information
- 26 February 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in IIE Transactions
- Vol. 39 (5) , 465-479
Abstract
We investigate how a supplier can use a quantity discount schedule to influence the stocking decisions of a downstream buyer that faces a single period of stochastic demand. In contrast to much of the work that has been done on single-period supply contracts, we assume that there are no interactions between the supplier and the buyer after demand information is revealed and that the buyer has better information about the distribution of demand than does the supplier. We characterize the structure of the optimal discount schedule for both all-unit and incremental discounts and show that the supplier can earn larger profits with an all-unit discount.Keywords
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- Using Return Policies to Elicit Retailer InformationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2004
- Coordinating pricing and inventory replenishment policies for one wholesaler and one or more geographically dispersed retailersInternational Journal of Production Economics, 2002
- Coordination Mechanisms for a Distribution System with One Supplier and Multiple RetailersManagement Science, 2001
- Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply ChainManagement Science, 2001
- Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participationNaval Research Logistics (NRL), 2001
- A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric InformationManagement Science, 2000
- Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry1999
- Multi-buyer discount pricingEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 1989
- Quantity Discounts: Managerial Issues and Research OpportunitiesMarketing Science, 1987
- INCENTIVES, UNCERTAINTY, AND RISK IN THE NEWSBOY PROBLEMDecision Sciences, 1979