Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games
Authors:
- Carlos Alós-FerrerCACarlos Alós-Ferrer
- Klaus RitzbergerKRKlaus Ritzberger
- 1 January 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 62, 5-18
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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