Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory ofWillful Hermeneutical Ignorance
Author:
- Gaile PohlhausGPGaile Pohlhaus
Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2012
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Hypatia
- Vol. 27 (4) , 715-735
Abstract
I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice.Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee'sTo Kill a Mockingbirdwith attention to the way in whichsituatednessandinterdependence work in tandem, I develop an understanding of willful hermeneutical ignorance, which occurs when dominantly situated knowers refuse to acknowledge epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those situated marginally. Such refusals allow dominantly situated knowers to misunderstand, misinterpret, and/or ignore whole parts of the world.Keywords
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