Regulatory pressure and consumer environmental awareness in a green supply chain with retailer responsibility: A dynamic analysis
Authors:
- 14 September 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 43 (4) , 1133-1151
Abstract
This paper develops a differential game model to study the effects of regulatory pressure and consumer environmental awareness on the channel members' profits and manufacturer's emissions in a supply chain. The government imposes pollution a tax and consumer green preference is considered. Results show that (i) in the decentralized scenario, the channel efficiency in higher regulatory pressure case is lower than that in the lower regulatory pressure scenario; (ii) whether the retailer responsibility is exogenous or negotiated, higher regulatory pressure or consumer environmental awareness can serve as an effective pollution‐curbing measure; (iii) the retailer responsibility can perfectly coordinate the supply chain.Keywords
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