Economic Benefits of Renting Software
Authors:
- Vidyanand ChoudharyVCVidyanand Choudhary
- Kerem TomakKTKerem Tomak
- Alok ChaturvediACAlok Chaturvedi
- 1 December 1998
- journal article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce
- Vol. 8 (4) , 277-305
Abstract
In this article, we analyze the economics of a monopoly firm selling and renting a packaged software product by employing an intertemporal monopoly pricing game to model the firm's pricing strategy. The game models the software product as two versions; the first version is available in the first period and the second, a revised version, is available in the second period. The second version benefits from consumer reports of bugs and requests for additional features. This is modeled using delayed network externalities that take effect only in the second period. We observe that the introduction of the rental product in the first period leads to an increase in profits. We also find that the firm's profits are monotonically increasing with the intensity of the network effect. As the intensity of the network effect becomes stronger, the firm chooses to reduce its prices in the first period to expand the size of its network and later increases prices in the second period. Because many of the customers who choose...Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Worldwide loss of over $13 billion to piracyComputer Fraud and Security, 1997
- Environmental decision making: research issues in the cosmetics and toiletries industryMarketing Intelligence & Planning, 1996
- Durable-Goods MonopolistsJournal of Political Economy, 1982
- Rational Expectations and Durable Goods PricingThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1981
- THE ECONOMICS OF SHORT‐TERM LEASINGEconomic Inquiry, 1980
- VALUATION OF FINANCIAL LEASE CONTRACTSThe Journal of Finance, 1976
- LEASING, BUYING, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL SERVICESThe Journal of Finance, 1976
- ASSET LEASING IN COMPETITIVE CAPITAL MARKETSThe Journal of Finance, 1976