Localized electromagnetic analysis of RO PUFs
Authors:
- 1 June 2013
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 19-24
Abstract
Among all proposed Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), those based on Ring Oscillators (ROs) are a popular solution for ASICs as well as for FPGAs. However, compared to other PUF architectures, oscillators emit electromagnetic (EM) signals over a relatively long run time, which directly reveal their unique frequencies. Previous work by Merli et al. exploited this fact by global EM measurements and proposed a countermeasure for their attack. In this paper, we first demonstrate that it is feasible to measure and locate the EM emission of a single tiny RO consisting of only three inverters, implemented within a single configurable logic block of a Xilinx Spartan-3A. Second, we present a localized EM attack for standard and protected RO PUFs. We practically investigate the proposed side-channel attack on a protected FPGA RO PUF implementation. We show that RO PUFs are prone to localized EM attacks and propose two countermeasures, namely, randomization of RO measurement logic and interleaved placement.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Interleaved EPE-Immune PA-DPL Structure for Resisting Concentrated EM Side Channel Attacks on FPGA Implementation2012
- Contactless Electromagnetic Active Attack on Ring Oscillator Based True Random Number Generator2012
- Localized Electromagnetic Analysis of Cryptographic Implementations2012
- PUFs: Myth, Fact or Busted? A Security Evaluation of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) Cast in Silicon2012
- Semi-invasive EM attack on FPGA RO PUFs and countermeasures2011
- Silicon physical random functions2002
- An LSI Random Number Generator (RNG)2000