The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments
Authors:
- Dong-Hun KimDKDong-Hun Kim
- 1 November 2005
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 38 (9) , 1104-1129
Abstract
The coexistence of strong parties and strong committees in the U.S. Congress has been interpreted in a principal-agent framework with committees regarded as agents of the congressional parties. In a parliamentary system having coalition governments, the coexistence of strong parties and strong committees has a comparable rationale. With data during a 40-year period, the authors showthat the coalition parties in the German parliament distribute committee chair positions so that coalition parties can monitor each other’s cabinet ministers. Such monitoring is an alternative at the legislative level to intracoalition monitoring through the use of junior ministers at the executive level and is a means of enforcing coalition treaties.Keywords
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