Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?
Authors:
- James F. CotterJCJames F. Cotter
- Anil ShivdasaniASAnil Shivdasani
- Marc ZennerMZMarc Zenner
- 1 February 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 43 (2) , 195-218
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 33 references indexed in Scilit:
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