Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between population size and the size of subnational legislatures, a question that has received far less attention than its national-level counterpart despite its importance for political representation. While a substantial literature shows that national parliaments tend to scale sublinearly with population—most commonly between square-root and cubic-root laws—little is known about whether similar patterns hold below the national level. Using an original dataset covering 804 subnational units across the nineteen sovereign G20 countries, including overseas, special, and outlying territories, this study analyzes the scaling relationship between population and the number of legislative seats in the highest subnational institutions. The sample spans a wide diversity of political systems, including federal and unitary states as well as democratic, hybrid, and authoritarian regimes. We estimate two complementary models, a log-linear specification and a nonlinear raw-data specification, to evaluate for sublinear scaling without imposing strong prior assumptions. The results show that proportional scaling has been abandoned at the subnational level and that sublinear scaling dominates across countries. Most countries exhibit scaling coefficients between 0.3 and 0.5, consistent with findings for national parliaments. These results document a first-order institutional regularity at the subnational level, with direct implications for the political economy of legislative design and the governance of population change. We discuss the convergence of scaling behavior across heterogeneous political systems and its implications for institutional reform.

This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit: