Statistical manipulability of social choice functions
Authors:
- 1 May 1996
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 5 (3) , 263-282
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
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