Programmable Logic Controller Forensics
Authors:
- Sebastian ObermeierSOSebastian Obermeier
- 28 November 2017
- journal article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 15 (6) , 18-24
Abstract
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) automate the control and monitoring of physical industrial and infrastructure processes such as power generation, gas pipelines, and water management. Due to the convergence of networking infrastructure, PLCs can be exposed to cyberattacks over the network with potentially catastrophic consequences. This contribution introduces the basic mechanisms by which various attacks can be detected, analyzed, and, ultimately, remedied.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- SCADA network forensics of the PCCC protocolDigital Investigation, 2017
- Hey, My Malware Knows Physics! Attacking PLCs with Physical Model Aware Rootkit2017
- Implementing attacks for modbus/TCP protocol in a real-time cyber physical system test bed2015
- Detecting Industrial Control Malware Using Automated PLC Code AnalyticsIEEE Security & Privacy, 2014
- SCADA Systems: Challenges for Forensic InvestigatorsComputer, 2012
- A Firmware Verification Tool for Programmable Logic Controllers2012
- Combating Memory Corruption Attacks On Scada Devices2010
- A Taxonomy of Attacks on the DNP3 Protocol2009
- Attack taxonomies for the Modbus protocolsInternational Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2008
- Forensic analysis of SCADA systems and networksInternational Journal of Security and Networks, 2008