Discipline with Common Agency: The Case of Audit and Nonaudit Services
Authors:
- 1 January 2004
- journal article
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 79 (1) , 173-200
Abstract
Using a common agency model, we investigate the interactions of a utility-maximizing auditor (the agent) with managers (who hire the agent for nonaudit services) and shareholders (who hire the agent for conducting an audit) of the same firm. In a single-period model, managerial discretion over consulting and other nonaudit service fees can influence auditors to issue unqualified opinions on reports that are more favorable than warranted. Shareholders, represented by an audit committee, cannot recover truth-telling. Removing the current restriction on contingent audit fees allows audit committees to offset the incentives provided by management and instead provide the auditor incentives to accept only truthful reports. Extending the model to a multiperiod framework, the audit committee can motivate truth-telling by making retention decisions that are contingent on outcome. Auditors will consider the impact of overreporting on their ability to generate future audit fees from the same client.Keywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Experimental Investigation of Self-Serving Biases in an Auditing Trust Game: The Effect of Group AffiliationThe Accounting Review, 2002
- The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings ManagementThe Accounting Review, 2002
- Common Agency and the Revelation PrincipleEconometrica, 2001
- Conflict and CooperationJournal of Economic Theory, 2001
- Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy MakingJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- Conservatism and Auditor-Client NegotiationsJournal of Accounting Research, 1991
- Common AgencyEconometrica, 1986
- Abnormal stock returns associated with media disclosures of ‘subject to’ qualified audit opinionsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1986
- Auditor IndependenceJournal of Accounting Research, 1984
- Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1981