Detector: An approach for detecting, isolating, and preventing timing attacks
Authors:
- Arsalan JaveedAJArsalan Javeed
- Cemal YilmazCYCemal Yilmaz
- Erkay SavasESErkay Savas
- 1 November 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 110
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Amazon Web Services
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