Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information
Authors:
- Andrew F. DaughetyADAndrew F. Daughety
- Jennifer F. ReinganumJRJennifer F. Reinganum
- 1 January 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 58 (1) , 94-120
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
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