Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading
Author:
- Thomas SchwartzTSThomas Schwartz
- 1 September 1977
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 71 (3) , 999-1010
Abstract
In legislatures and committees, a number of issues are voted on separately, leading to an outcome consisting of positions on each of these issues. I investigate the effects this separation of issues has on collective choices, assuming a very abstract collective choice model, whose assumptions are presupposed by many less abstract models, notably spatial models. Assuming the model, if there exists an undominated outcome (one to which no winning coalition prefers any other feasible outcome), it must be chosen in the absence of vote trading, although vote trading can (perversely) lead to a very different outcome. But vote trading does not necessarily lead to a “voting paradox” situation, contrary to several recent papers. The model enables us to define a natural solution concept for the case where every feasible outcome is dominated. Variations on this concept are explored. The effects of weakening the model are investigated.Keywords
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