Competition and innovation: an experimental investigation
- 1 December 2010
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 13 (4) , 439-460
Abstract
The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms’ investments in process innovations. More intense competition corresponds to an increase in the number of firms or a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition. We carry out experiments for two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. An increase in the number of firms from two to four reduces investments, whereas a switch from Cournot to Bertrand increases investments, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case. The results arise both in treatments in which both stages are implemented and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented. However, the positive effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition is more pronounced in the former case.Keywords
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