Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
Authors:
- Haluk ErginHEHaluk Ergin
- 1 January 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 90 (1-2) , 215-237
Abstract
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This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
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