China’s Pseudo-monetary Policy
- 20 June 2014
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Finance
- Vol. 19 (1) , 55-93
Abstract
China’s monetary stimulation after the global financial crisis rapidly boosted its GDP. We argue that its efficacy derives from state control over its banking and corporate sectors. Beijing ordered state-owned banks to lend and they lent. Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest and they invested. Our data show much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases of real estate and land prices rises occurred where these SOEs were active buyers. This episode mimics the credit channel for monetary policy, but actually entails internal transfers between arms of the government pressuring on real estate prices upwards.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
- Robust Inference With Multiway ClusteringJournal of Business & Economic Statistics, 2011
- China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption2009
- China's Industrial Development2008
- China's Financial System: Past, Present, and Future2008
- Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy*Journal of Management Studies, 2006
- Reforming China’s State-owned Enterprises and Banks2006
- Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprisesJournal of Comparative Economics, 2005
- Law, finance, and economic growth in ChinaJournal of Financial Economics, 2005
- The Geographic Concentration of Industry: Does Natural Advantage Explain Agglomeration?American Economic Review, 1999
- Central-local relations in china during the reform era: The economic and institutional dimensionsWorld Development, 1996