A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards
Author:
- Arnaud CostinotACArnaud Costinot
- 1 May 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Economics
- Vol. 75 (1) , 197-213
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
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